Pakistan faces diplomatic bind as US conditions Iran peace deal on Israel normalization
Washington’s demand for Islamabad to join the Abraham Accords as a prerequisite for ending the Iran war presents Islamabad with a complex policy dilemma, pitting economic and diplomatic leverage against deep-seated public opposition and regional stability.

Pakistan is navigating a significant diplomatic challenge following US President Donald Trump’s demand that Islamabad, alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar, sign the Abraham Accords to normalise relations with Israel. This condition is presented as a prerequisite for concluding the ongoing war between the US-Israel coalition and Iran. As a key mediator who successfully persuaded the US to halt attacks on Iran in April, Pakistan faces a strategic dilemma: while joining the accords could offer economic and diplomatic benefits, analysts warn it would severely damage Pakistan’s standing on the Palestinian issue, exacerbate tensions with Iran, and trigger domestic instability due to strong public opposition.
The US president outlined the requirement in a social media post on Monday, stating that any agreement to end the Iran war should see countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Qatar join the Abraham Accords. Trump wrote that it should be mandatory for these nations to simultaneously sign onto the accords, listing Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and Bahrain as countries discussed. He insisted that Saudi Arabia and Qatar should immediately sign the agreements, with others following suit. The accords, originally brokered in 2020, aim to normalise ties between Israel and several Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
Islamabad’s position is complicated by its current role as a mediator in the conflict. In April, Pakistan managed to convince the US to cease attacks on Iran that began on 28 February, a move that has disrupted Pakistan’s energy supply and caused fuel prices to soar. The country’s mediation efforts have been acknowledged by Trump, who has referred to Pakistan’s military chief Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif as his “favorite” people. This closeness has elevated Pakistan’s global status, yet the demand to join the accords presents a far more complex policy challenge than its mediation role.
Analysts suggest that while joining the accords could yield diplomatic goodwill in Washington and Gulf capitals, the political risks are substantial. Raza Rumi, a political analyst, noted that the benefits are real but politically overstated. He warned that normalization could damage Pakistan’s standing on Palestine, fuel further tension with Iran, and increase domestic instability. Rumi emphasized that without meaningful progress toward Palestinian statehood, normalization would appear less like strategic autonomy and more like capitulation, with costs likely outweighing gains.
The decision is closely linked to Saudi Arabia’s stance, given the close diplomatic, economic and security ties between Islamabad and Riyadh. However, experts argue that Saudi action alone would not automatically allow Pakistan to proceed due to its distinct domestic political landscape. Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to the US and the UN, stated that Islamabad could only consider normalization if an independent and contiguous Palestinian state is established with Jerusalem as its capital. She described this as a firm position, noting that Pakistan’s decision would not be based solely on what other countries do.
Domestic opposition remains a critical constraint. Rumi highlighted that religious parties, Islamist groups, and sections of the right-wing media would likely frame recognition of Israel as a betrayal of Pakistan’s ideological commitments. The government would face street agitation, parliamentary criticism, and accusations of acting under foreign pressure. With the Gaza war having made public opinion even more hostile to normalization, any government attempting such a move would encounter significant backlash.
Pakistan’s economic dependence on the US also weighs heavily on the decision. The US remains Pakistan’s largest single export destination, crucial for generating foreign revenue for its struggling economy, and Washington holds significant sway over global monetary institutions like the IMF. However, the energy disruptions caused by the Iran war have intensified the urgency for a resolution. The intersection of these geopolitical, economic, and domestic factors leaves Islamabad in a bind with no easy way out.


