Historical analysis challenges 'great man' theory with Kaiser Wilhelm II case study
A new examination of the German Emperor’s erratic diplomacy and personnel control suggests ordinary leaders can drive historical outcomes as significantly as talented ones.
A 2026 article published on the platform Dead Carl presents a historical analysis of Kaiser Wilhelm II, arguing that his personal incompetence and erratic behaviour were decisive factors in shaping 20th-century history. The piece challenges traditional "great man" historiography and structuralist theories by proposing a "mediocre man" theory, suggesting that ordinary or incompetent individuals in positions of power can have consequences as significant as those of talented leaders.
The analysis asserts that Wilhelm’s control over personnel appointments and his capricious diplomacy led to Germany’s diplomatic isolation, contributing to the outbreak of the First World War, despite his personal ambivalence towards conflict. The text cites recent research by historians John C. Röhl and Annika Mombauer to argue that Wilhelm II was not a "shadow emperor" but actively centralised power, particularly over personnel and military appointments, due to the specific structure of the German constitution.
The article details specific instances of Wilhelm’s erratic behaviour, such as his initial order to raze Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion (later rescinded), his public declarations of unwillingness to go to war during the First Morocco Crisis and the Balkan Wars, and his reliance on personal favour rather than merit for promotions. It highlights that Wilhelm’s influence persisted even during the war, where he retained the power to appoint and dismiss key figures, such as sustaining Erich von Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff despite his unpopularity among the high command.
The piece introduces the "mediocre man" theory of history, positing that history is shaped not only by great leaders or structural forces, but also by ordinary people who end up in positions of extraordinary importance, including those who are incompetent. It challenges both "great man" theories and structuralist theories by focusing on the impact of individual incompetence and erratic behaviour.
The analysis suggests that while structural forces played a role, the specific decisions made by Wilhelm, driven by his immaturity and desire for personal favour, made Germany’s diplomatic isolation inevitable. This incoherence led other powers to view Germany as a rogue state, forming an encircling pact against it. The article concludes that the politics of Europe before the First World War cannot be understood without an understanding of Wilhelm’s character and the form of governance it produced.
