Foreign Office bypassed vetting warnings to clear Mandelson as ambassador

Questions regarding the security vetting of Peter Mandelson have intensified following revelations that Foreign Office officials granted him clearance as UK ambassador to Washington against the advice of the United Kingdom Security Vetting (UKSV) agency. The decision, made in late January 2025, bypassed a formal review of the vetting file and relied on oral briefings, raising concerns about governance protocols and national security safeguards.

UKSV concluded its assessment on 28 January 2025, assigning a “high” concern rating and recommending that clearance be denied. The agency cited Mandelson’s associations with Chinese Finance Minister Lan Fo’an, Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, and former Israeli military intelligence general Tamir Hayman. Additionally, UKSV flagged a £1m loan provided by a British businessman to purchase shares in the Israeli startup Moon Active, noting that Mandelson appeared naive to the risks inherent in these historical relationships.

Despite these findings, Olly Robbins, then permanent secretary at the Foreign Office, granted clearance the following day. Robbins did not review UKSV’s nine-page written summary, relying instead on an oral briefing from Ian Collard, who had also not seen the file. Corin Robertson, the Foreign Office’s chief operating officer, was also involved in the decision. Collard and Robbins described the case as “borderline”, a term not present in UKSV documents and one that some involved cannot recall with certainty.

The concept of “mitigations” applied to the clearance has become a focal point of parliamentary scrutiny. Robbins stated that mitigations were put in place to manage risks, but MP John Hayes, a member of the intelligence and security committee, asked Minister Darren Jones to confirm if any documents existed recording these measures. Jones referenced mitigations related to commercial interests, which may not address the broader security concerns identified by UKSV regarding Mandelson’s links to foreign officials.

A government review is currently investigating whether Mandelson’s associations compromised national security or influenced official discussions during his tenure. This audit will examine if his relationships with figures in China, Russia, and Israel created conflicts of interest, particularly regarding sensitive briefings Mandelson received on China in early 2025. The review also seeks to clarify why Mandelson did not declare the £1m loan in the House of Lords register of interests in 2019, despite disclosing his shareholding in Moon Active.